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MIRJAN DAMASKA
Free Proof and its Detractors
The idea that the law should not assign probative weight to
items of information, or degrees of credibility to its bearers, is widely
extolled as one of the cornerstones of enlightened factfinding in adju-
dication.1 Despite momentous changes that have occurred in the ad-
ministration ofjustice in this century, the idea continues to command
widespread allegiance - especially in the area of criminal procedure.
This is not to say, however, that no challenges appeared to the idea in
recent years. The first challenge stems from the increased employ-
ment over the past few decades of exclusionary rules of evidence.
Their application generates frequently overlooked strains with the
factfinder's freedom in analyzing evidence. The second challenge is
posed by socio-cultural ramifications of technological and scientific
advances made in this century. Although for the most part only la-
tent, this second challenge is potentially quite serious and far-reach-
ing. As we near the next millennium, the question is thus worth
asking whether free proof is still as firmly entrenched in justice sys-
tems as it appears on the surface of things - even in the stronghold
of free proof rhetoric, that is, iIi criminal procedure.
An initial difficulty in addressing this question is that attitudes
toward the relation of the law to the analysis of evidence are not ex-
actly alike in the Anglo-American and continental European legal
traditions. Failure to take account of these differences is capable of
muddling clarity of thought on the subject. To remedy this initial dif-
ficulty, I begin by outlining different approaches to free proof in the
two branches of the Western legal tradition.
I. CONTINENTAL AND COMMON LAw ATTITUDES
As is well known, continental views on free proof evolved against
the background of criticism of ancien regime's evidence law at the
time of the French Revolution. The main object of this criticism were
rules of Roman-canon provenance that assigned weight to specified
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1. For civil law systems, see Rudolf Schlesinger, et al., Comparative Law 425
(5th ed. 1988). To some commentators, free evaluation of evidence is an "irreversible
stage" in the evolution of proof systems. See Massimo Nobill, II Principio del Libero
Convincimento del Giudice 5-6 (1974).
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